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February 22, 2000 U.S. Assistance Options for the Andes The Honorable
Senator Charles Grassley Good morning and welcome. The hearing this morning is to look at US counter-drug policy for the Andean region. We have a lot of important ground to cover today, so I intend to keep my formal remarks short. The proposed emergency assistance package that the Administration has submitted to Congress is one of the most significant foreign policy initiatives in recent years. It marks a major escalation in US counter-drug efforts in Colombia. It comes about as the result of a major expansion in drug production and trafficking from Colombia. The principal target for most of the drugs produced there is the United States. That expansion has occurred despite an already extensive US-supported effort in Colombia. And it has happened in large part because so-called Marxist guerrillas in that unfortunate country have aligned themselves with drug pushers, becoming drug thugs themselves. A high murder rate and endemic violence by narco-traffickers, guerrillas, and paramilitaries, mean that Colombia faces unprecedented challenges. The fate of democratic institutions and future of decent government are at risk. Clearly, it is in the US national interest to be concerned about not only what is happening in Colombia but what we can and must do about the situation there. But it does make a difference how we engage and the purpose of our engagement is to make a difference. This hearing is to look at how the present proposals will accomplish important goals that will help Colombia and the United States. Last year, Senators Coverdell, DeWine, and I introduced the
Alianza Act. The purpose of that effort was to urge immediate and,
let me stress this, thoughtful responses not just ad hoc,
temporizing, piecemeal efforts. What we asked for in that
legislation was for the Administration to submit a strategy for how
to make a difference not a grab bag of goodies bundled together.
There are serious issues involved that require serious
consideration. Our goal was and is to see Colombia supported. The
Alianza Act, indeed, tried to prime the pump, as it were. But we
also sought to fund a coherent, comprehensive, intelligent strategy
not a list of projects. Let me quote from the Act on what Congress
wanted then and expects now. It isn’t complicated but it is
necessary. What we need is to see a plan that At this point, we have yet to see such a detailed plan. What we have seen is various wish lists, and many of these have been vague. Even these wish lists appear uncoordinated and divergent. It is my hope that we can clarify the picture today. This Caucus tried to get that clarity in a similar hearing late last year. The Administration did not seem able to shed much light then. I hope we do better today. Let me be clear. I believe that it is important to support Colombia. The situation there is serious and how it develops is of direct concern to us. We have an obligation to help. But it makes a difference how we go about providing that help. Poorly conceived and badly implemented programs will do more harm than doing nothing at all. We will have a lot of questions today on the issue of just what it is we are going to do, how, and with what result. Let me conclude by introducing for the record a letter I have
received from the GAO detailing some of its recent findings on
problems with our efforts in Colombia. Members will find copies of
that communication in their packages. I will read just one brief
passage: This suggests that we are in the process of considering a major support package without a clear idea of what it is we are proposing to do. That was clear last year. I am not too sure that things are better this year. That’s what I hope to hear more about today. We need an approach that will take the initiative away from the traffickers and their allies. If we don’t, all we will be doing is playing an expensive game of hopscotch all over the region, and that’s a formula for losing. |
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